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NOTES
THE STANDARD OF CARE OWED BY A HOSPITAL
TO ITS PATIENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the: great number of tort cases which have arisen between hos-
pitals and their patients, comparatively little has been written upon the
subject of the standard of care required of a hospital in its relationship with
those who enter it for treatment. In this Note some of the types of problems
arising out of this relationship will be examined.' Questions of substantive
and procedural law will be treated together in order to present these prob-
lems more clearly.
Generally, public hospitals are excused from tort liability to their pa-
tients upon the ground of governmental immunity ;2 in most states charitable
institutions enjoy some degree of limited liability upon one of several theories,
all or most of which rest upon an underlying public policy.3 Since supposedly
no public policy favors the exemption from liability of private hospitals con-
ducted for profit,4 cases involving such institutions present most clearly the
problems of the standard of care required in the hospital-patient relationship.
Therefore only those cases and cases in which charitable institutions have
1. The term "hospital" is used herein in a general sense and refers to the several
types of institutions which receive the sick, injured, aged, etc., and undertake to provide
services and treatment for them. The term "patient" is also used generally and refers
to those entering a hospital for care and treatment.
2. E.g., University of Louisville v. Metcalfe, 216 Ky. 339, 287 S. W. 945, 49 A. L. R.
375 (1926); Benton v. City Hospital, 140 Mass. 13, 1 N. E. 836 (1885); Borchard,
Government Liability in Tort, 34 YAE L. J. 229, 248 (1925); Note, 48 YALE L. J.
81, 89 (1938).
3. For discussions of the various theories of the immunity of charitable institutions,
see 2 BoGERT, TRuSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 401 et seq. (1935) ; PRossE-, TORTS 1079 et seq.
(1941); 3 Scorr, TRusTs § 402 (1939); Appleman, The Tort Liability of Charitable
Institutions, 22 A. B. A. J. 48 (1936) ; Feezer, The Tort Liability of Charities, 77 U.
oF PA. L. REv. 191 (1928); Notes, 14 B. U. L. REv. 477 (1934), 25 HAiry. L. REv.
721 (1912), 31 HALv. L. REv. 479 (1918), 29 IOWA L. REV. 624 (1944), 19 Miss. L. J.
220 (1948), 34 YALE L. J. 316 (1925); 1 VAND. L. REV. 153 (1947); 1 VAND. L. REV.
470 (1948). For collections of cases upon the subject, see Notes, 14 A. L. R. 572 (1921),
23 A. L. R. 923 (1924), 42 A. L. R. 971 (1926), 62 A. L. R. 724 (1929), 86 A. L. R.
491 (1933), 109 A. L. R. 1199 (1937), 133 A. L. R. 821 (1941).
4. "The policy of the law forbids liability of a state or municipal hospital for the
negligence of its servants and physicians; it being a governmental agency, . . . On
similar grounds, the law exempts charitable institutions from liability for the negligence
of its [sic] servants and agents .... In the case of a private hospital the capital invested
is neither public money nor a trust fund. It is like capital invested in any other
corporation conducted for profit. Hence there is no ground of public policy upon which
it can be exempted from liability for negligence on the part of its servants or agents."
Jenkins v. Charleston Hospital, 90 W. Va. 230, 110 S. E. 560, 561, 22 A. L. R. 323
(1922) ; see Welch v. Frisbie Memorial Hospital, 90 N. H. 337, 9 A. 2d 761, 763 (1939).
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been held fully responsible to their patients5 will be considered herein. Cases
involving the liability of hospitals to employees, licensees, and persons other
than patients are not within the scope of this Note. No express attention is
given to the problems of the extent of damages, cause in fact, or legal cause,
although in any discussion of duty these problems are involved to some extent.
As in all other situations in which there is a duty to use care, the duty
resting upon a hospital towards its patients arises out of the relationship into
which it enters with them. A hospital generally may make rules for the
admission of patients, and, at least in the case of a private institution, there.is
no obligation to admit those seeking treatment unless they conform to such
rules.6 However, as in the case of physicians 7 or other persons,s once a hos-
pital accepts a person for treatment, it may not with impunity refuse to treat
him or treat him in a careless manner.6 This is true regardless of the fact that
the patient may have agreed to pay only a small amount for the services'
or is furnished services gratuitously." Once the relationship has arisen, the
duty to use care is present, and the duty is not proportionate to the amount
paid.
Ordinarily the hospital-patient relationship, like that' of carrier and
passenger, results from a-contract, express or implied, by which the hospital
undertakes to furnish certain types of services for a specified price. For
failure to furnish the agreed service, or for furnishing it improperly, the
hospital, like the carrier, may be liable for damages in a contract action.' 2 By
5. 'In Tennessee, for example, 'a charitable hospital is liable in tort just as a private
hospital; its only immunity is that judgment may not be collected from its trust
property. O'Quin v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, 184 Tenn. 570, 201 S. W. 2d 694 (1947) ;
James v. Turner, 184 Tenn. 563, 201 S. W. 2d 691 (1941); Spivey v. St. Thomas
Hospital, 211 S. W. 2d 450 (Tenn. App. M. S. 1947) ; Vanderbilt University v. Hender-
son, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S. W. 2d 284 (M. S. 1938). See also Mulliner v. Evangel-
ischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 175 N. W. 699 (1920) (rejecting the rule
of limited liability for charitable hospitals).
6. E.g., Birmingham Baptist Hospital v. Crews, 229 Ala. 398, 157 So. 224 (1934)
(child with contagious disease denied admission).
7. Viita v. Dolan, 132 Minn. 128, 155 N. W. 1077 (1916); Barnes v. Gardner, 170
Misc. 604, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 785 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (matter left in wound of charity patient) ;
Du Bois v. Decker, 130 N. Y. 325, 29 N. E. 313 (1891) (physician treating patients
in almshouse) ; PROssER, TORTS 202 (1941).
8. E.g., Tullgren v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 82 N. H. 268, 133 AtI. 4 (1926) (employee,
known to be ill, taken nearly home .but permitted to walk part of way in hot sun);
Zelenko v. Gimbel Bros. Inc., 158 Misc. 904, 287 N. Y. Supp. 134 (Sup. Ct. 1935),
aff'd inere., 247 App. Div. 867, 287 N. Y. Supp. 136 (lst Dep't 1936) (department store
undertook to aid sick customer).
9. St. Louis S. W. R. R. v. Webb, 170 Ark. 1089, 282 S. W. 966 (1926) (doctors
of company hospital refused to operate on patient accepted by hospital despite knowledge
of critical condition) ; see Guilliams v. Hollywood Hospital, 18 Cal. 2d 97, 114 P. 2d 1,
5 (1941). RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 320 (1934).
10. Harris v. Woman's Hospital, 14 N. Y. Supp. 881, 883 (N. Y. City Ct. 1891);
Wetzel v. Omaha Maternity & General Hospital Ass'n, 96 Neb. 636, 148 N. W. 582
(1914) ; Carver Chiropractic College v. Armstrong, 103 Okla. 123, 229 Pac. 641 (1924).
11. See Gitzhoffen v. Sisters of Holy Cross Hospital Ass'n, 32 Utah 46, 88 Pac.
691, 696, 8 L. R. A. (N.s.) 1161 (1907).
12. Gooch v. Buford, 262 Fed. 894 (6th Cir. 1920) (action on contract held not
barred by verdict for negligence in not providing special nurse) ; Ward v. St. Vincent's
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far the greater number of cases between hospitals and patients, however, are
actions in tort rather than in contract, and are brought, not for breach of the
contractual obligation, but for breach of the legal duty arising when the con-
tract was made. "The duty imposed by law substantially coincides with the
contract, but it arises out of the mere undertaking to perform the service and
would exist if there were no contract at all .... ,
II. THE DUTY TO USE DUE CARE
Generally an individual's duty to use care arises out of his relationship
with another. 14 The standard for determining when this duty has been
breached is generally expressed as that care which would be exercised by a
reasonably prudent person under the ,same or similar circumstances.16 As
applied to hospitals, the usual statement of the standard of care to be em-
ployed in the treatment of a patient is "such reasonable care and attention for
his safety as his mental and physical condition, if known, may require." 16
Only reasonable care under the same or similar circumstances is required as
in the case of other private corporations or individuals ;1 and although this
at times may be a very great amount of care indeed,18 nevertheless the jury
may be instructed that "this is always limited by the unbending rule that no
one. is required to guard against or take measures to avert that which under
the circumstances is not likely to happen, or, more accurately, which a rea-
sonable person under the circumstances would not anticipate as likely to
happen. The law only requires . . . that care to avert danger which a reason-
able man would take under the circumstances as they exist-and no man does
or is required to take measures to avert a danger which the circumstances as
Hospital, 39 App. Div. 624, 57 N. Y. Supp. 784 (Ist Dep't 1899); Archibald v. Hill
Sanatorium, 121 Misc. 193, 201 N. Y. Supp. 86 (Sup. Ct. 1923). Where a nurse acted
beyond the scope of her employment in stealing patient's ring, a hospital was held not
liable for negligence; but the court indicated that a contract action against it might lie.
Vannah v. Hart Private Hospital, 228 Mass. 132, 117 N. E. 328, L. R. A. 1918A
1157 (1917).
13. PROSSER, ToRTs 293-94 (1941).
14. Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q. B. D. 503 (1883).
15. PRossER, ToRTs 224 (1941); GRaEN, JUDGE AND JURY c. 5 (1930); Seavey,
Negligence-Subjective or Objective, 41 HARv. L. REv. 1, 9 (1927) ; Terry, Negligence,
29 HARV. L. REv. 40, 41 (1915).
16. Wetzel v. Omaha Maternity & General Hospital Ass'n, 96 Neb. 636, 148 N. W.
582, 583 (1914); see also Emory University v. Shadburn, 47 Ga. App. 643, 171 S, E.
192, 193 (1933), aff'd inem., 180 Ga. 595, 180 S. E. 137 (1935); Paulen v. Shinnick,
291 Mich. 288, 289 N. W. 162, 163 (1939) ; Davis v. Springfield Hospital, 204 Mo. App.
626, 218 S. W. 696, 699 (1920); Danville Community Hospital v. Thompson, 186 Va.
746, 43 S. E. 2d 882, 886 (1947). For collections of cases, see Notes 22 A. L. R. 341
(1923), 39 A. L. R. 1431 (1925), 124 A. L. R. 186 (1940).
17. Notes, 8 FoRD. L. REv. 378, 381 (1939), 48 YALE L. J. 81 (1938).
18. E.g., Runyan v. Goodrum, 147 Ark. 481, 228 S. W. 397, 13 A. L. R. 1403 (1921)
(duty to furnish X-ray equipment must be performed with high degree of care) ; Spivey
v. St. Thomas Hospital, 211 S. W. 2d 450 (Tenn. App. M. S. 1947) (patient known to
be delirious leaped from window; hospital liable despite precautions taken, including
strapping patient to bed and tying sheets over him).
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known to him do not suggest as reasonably likely to happen." 19 A few courts
have insisted that not only is there a duty. to use care under the known cir-
cumstances but also a duty to investigate and learn of the patient's physical
and mental condition ;20 however, the general standard would probably in-
clude this duty to investigate as part of the hospital's undertaking and it prob-
ably does not amount to a separate and special duty apart from that imposed
by the use of "reasonable care."
In applying the general standard of reasonable care to physicians and
surgeons, the courts make the standard more particular, and by analogy
some courts have applied to the hospital-patient relationship the standard used
in the physician cases. Generally, physicians are required to use that amount
of skill, knowledge and diligence which others of the same school of medical
thought in good standing employ in similar circumstances - and in similar
localities. 21 In applying this standard to the hospital cases some courts have
stated that a hospital must employ "that degree of care, skill, and diligence
used by hospitals generally in the community." 22 This rule has not generally
been followed, however, and some courts have openly rejected it as applied to
the duty of the hospital, although admitting that it may be correctly applied in
determining the responsibility of the institution for the professional conduct
of its doctors and nurses.23 One court which held that it was not error to
instruct the jury according to the professional standard also said, "Broadly
speaking, ordinary care, that care which persons of common prudence ex-
ercise under like conditions, is the degree of care recognized by the courts
throughout the country .... The hospital is liable for want of ordinary care,
whether from incompetency of the nurse, or failure of duty by a fully qualified
nurse." 24
In instructions to the jury the courts express only in broad terms how
the standard of reasonable care under the circumstances is to be applied to the
19. Davis v. Springfield Hospital, 204 Mo. App. 626, 218 S. W. 696, 699 (1920);
Wood v. Samaritan Institution, Inc., 156 P. 2d 470, 471 (Cal.' App. 1945), rev'd, 26
Cal. 2d 847, 161 P. 2d 556 (1945) ; Paulen v. Shinnick, 291 Mich. 288, 289 N.- W. 162,'
164 (1939) ("omniscience" not required of a hospital); Fetzer v. Aberdeen Clinic, 48
S. D. 308, 204 N. W. 364, 366, 39 A. L. R. 1423 (1925); Nelson v. Rural Education
Ass'n, 23 Tenn. App. 409, 425, 134 S. W. 2d 181 (M. S. 1939).
20. Durfee v. Dorr, 123 Ark. 542, 186 S. W. 62, 63 (1916); Piedmont Hospital v.
Anderson, 65 Ga. App. 491, 16 S. E. 2d 90, 93 (1941) ; Mesedahl v. St. Luke's Hospital
Ass'n, 194 Minn. 198, 259 N. W. 819, 820 (1935) ; Maki v. Murray Hospital, 91 Mont.
251, 7 P. 2d 228 (1932).
21. E.g., Cook v. Moats, 121 Neb. 769, 238 N. W. 529 (1931) ; Spead v. Tomlinson,
73 N. H. 46, 59 Atl. 376 (1904) ; Hardy v. Dahl, 210 N. C. 530, 187 S. E. 788 (1936);
Coon v. Shields, 88 Utah 76, 39 P. 2d 348 (1934); Williams v. Marini, 105 Vt. 11,
162 Atl. 796 (1932).
22. Birmingham Baptist Hospital v. Branton, 218 Ala. 464, 118 So. 741, 744 (1928);
see also South Highlands Infirmary v. Galloway, 233 Ala. 276, 171 So. 250, 253 (1936);
Hogan v. Clarksburg Hospital Co., 63 W. Va. 84, 59 S. E. 943, 945 (1907).
23. Hayhurst v. Boyd Hospital, 43 Idaho 661, 254 Pac. 528, 529 (1927).
24. South Highlands Infirmary v. Galloway, 223 Ala. 276, 171 So. 250, 253 (1936).
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particular case.25 Among the "circumstances" which the jury may be told to
consider are the "mental incapacity of the patient and the dangers which the
surroundings indicate may befall such a patient in view of any peculiar mental
traits exhibited by the patient .... ,, 26 The jury may be instructed to consider
the patient's "mental condition and aberrations and what he is likely to do
by reason thereof," 27 but they are also told 'that the mere fact that a patient
is delirious will not put the hospital's servants on notice that he needs special
attention.28 Knowledge of the patient's condition possessed by the institution
and its duty to have knowledge 9 may be mentioned to the jury. They are
also told that the hospital's duty is measured "by the capacity of the patient
to provide for his own safety." 30 According to some of the appellate courts,
the fact that the hospital specializes in the treatment of nervous and mental
cases may impose upon it a higher degree of care in learning the past history
of the patient ;31 but ordinarily the type of hospital will only be one of the
"circumstances" to be considered, and the jury are given no special instruc-
tions regarding it in the trial court.32
The rules of pleading, evidence and burden of proof are the same in
hospital cases as in other negligence actions. 33 Substantial evidence of neg-
ligence must be produced before the case may go to the jury.3 4 Many of the
25. E.g., Stansfield v. Gardner, 56 Ga. App. 634, 193 S. E. 375, 384 (1937) ; Hignite's
Adm'x v. Louisville Neuropathic Sanitorium, 223 Ky. 497, 4 S. W. 2d 407, 409 (1928) ;
Goldfoot v. Lofgren, 135 Ore. 533, 296 Pac. 843, 849 (1931) ; Fetzer v. Aberdeen Clinic,
48 S. D. 308, 204 N. W. 364, 366 (1925) ; 41 C. J. S., Hospitals § 10 (1944).
26. Fetzer v. Aberdeen Clinic, 48 S. D. 308, 204 N. W. 364, 366 (1925) ; see also
Davis v. Springfield Hospital, 204 Mo. App. 626, 218 S. W. 696, 699 (1926).
27. Davis v. Springfield Hospital, supra note 26.
28. Fetzer v. Aberdeen Clinic, supra note 26.
29. Hignite's Adm'x v. Louisville Neuropathic Sanitorium, 223 Ky. 497, 4 S. W.
2d 407, 409 (1928) ; Mesedahl v. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n, 194 Minn. 198, 259 N. W.
819, 820 (1935) ; Maki v. Murray Hospital, 91 Mont. 251, 7 P. 2d 228 (1932) ; James v.
Turner, 184 Tenn. 563, 568, 201 S. W. 2d 691 (1941).
30. Robertson v. Towns Hospital, 178 App. Div. 285, 165 N. Y. Supp. 17, 18
(2d Dep't 1917) ; Valentin v. La Societe Francaise, 76 Cal. App. 2d 1, 172 P. 2d 359,
361 (1946) ; Fowler v. Norways Sanitorium, 112 Ind. App. 347, 42 N. E. 2d 415, 418
(1942) ; Tulsa Hospital Ass'n v. Juby, 73 Okla. 243, 175 Pac. 519, 523 (1918) ; Hogan
v. Clarksburg Hospital Co., 63 W. Va. 84, 59 S. E. 943 (1907).
31. See Mesedahl Y. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n, 194 Minn. 198, 259 N. W. 819,
823 (1935).
32. Hignite's Adm'x v. Louisville Neuropathic Sanitorium, 223 Ky. 497, 4 S. W.
2d 407, 409 (1928); Torrey v. Riverside Sanitarium, 163 Wis. 71, 157 N. W. 552,
553 (1916) ; James v. Turner, 184 Tenn. 563, 568, 201 S. W. 2d 691 (1941). Similarly
a doctor, although he is a specialist, will not be required to exercise a higher degree of
care for that reason; the general standard is applied to him, and his special skill is
merely a "circumstance" not requiring a special instruction. Beach v. Collett, 31 Ohio
App. 8, 166 N. E. 145, 146 (1928).
33. 41 C. J. S., Hospitals § 10 (1944); Notes, 22 A. L. R. 341, 355 (1923), 39
A. L. R. 1431, 1436 (1925), 124 A. L. R. 186, 205 (1940). The declaration of the
plaintiff may sound either in contract or in tort as a general rule. Parrish v, Clark, 107
Fla. 598, 145 So. 848 (1933). The fact that negligence is alleged does not necessarily
prevent the action from being in contract. Archibald v. Hill Sanatorium, 121 Misc. 193,
201 N. Y. Supp. 86 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
34. E.g., Papini v. Alexander Sanitarium, Inc., 12 Cal. Apn. 2d 249, 55 P. 2d 270
(1936) ; Pangle v. Appalachian Hall, 190 N. C. 833, 131 S. E. 42 (1925). Preponderance
of the evidence is required to prove that an injury was proximately caused by the
hospital's negligence. Phillipson v. Hunt, 129 Ore. 242, 276 Pac. 255, 257 (1929). As to
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questions arising in these cases are particularly suited to the use of expert
testimony, 35 and in many instances evidence of custom and usage may be an
important factor in proving the presence or absence of reasonable care.3 6 In a
number of situations the patient may rely upon the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur,37 particularly where he has been burned while unconscious 38 or
where he has been permitted to leap from a hospital window.39
The general standard of reasonable care on the part of the hospital has
had many types of applications. For example, the hospital has been held
liable for affirmative acts of negligence by its servants, such as the applica-
tion of overheated water bottles, 40 the giving of a transfusion to the wrong
patient, 41 the negligent injection of medicine into the patient's body,42 and
the preparation of the wrong medicine for him ;43 it has also been held for
negative acts or omissions, such as leaving the patient unguarded for too
long under the circumstances, 44 failure to detect hospital-inflicted injuries,45
whether the records of a hospital may be introduced as evidence there is a split of
authority. Notes 75 A. L. R. 279 (1931), 120 A. L. R. 1124 (1939).
35. E.g., Barfield v. South Highland Infirmary, 191 Ala. 553, 68 So. 30 (1915);
Mesedahl v. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n, 194 Minn. 198, 259 N. W. 819 (1935); but
where the issue is one which a layman is capable of deciding, the expert is not needed.
Mills v. Richardson, 126 Me. 244, 137 Atl. 689 (1927); Paulen v. Shinnick, 291 Mich.
288, 289 N. W. 162 (1939).
36. E.g., Maki v. Murray Hospital, 91 Mont. 251, 7 P. 2d 228, 230 (1932);
Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COL. L. REV. 1147, 1163 (1942).
37. E.g., Dierman v. Providence Hospital, 31 Cal. 2d 290, 188 P. 2d 12 (1947)
(explosion of anesthetic).
38. E.g., Timbrell v. Suburban Hospital, Inc., 4 Cal. 2d 68, 47 P. 2d 737 (1935);
Meyer v. McNutt Hospital, 173 Cal. 156, 159 Pac. 436 (1916); Quillen v. Skaggs,
233 Ky. 1-71, 25 S. W. 2d 33 (1930).
39. E.g., Richardson v. Dumas, 106 Miss. 664, 64 So. 459 (1914) ; Maki v. Mhurray
Hospital, 91 Mont. 251, 7 P. 2d 228 (1932).
40. Burns from hot water bottles give rise to a very large percentage of the hospital
cases. Note, 48 YALE L. J. 81, 82 (1938). Among the many cases on the point see
Timbrell v. Suburban Hospital, Inc., 4 Cal. 2d 68, 47 P. 2d 737 (1935); Meyer v.
McNutt Hospital, 173 Cal. 156, 159 Pac. 436 (1916); Quillen v. Skaggs, 233 Ky. 171,
25 S. W. 2d 33 (1930) ; Iacono v. New York Polyclinic Medical School, 269 App. Div.
955, 58 N. Y. S. 2d 244 (2d Dep't 1945.), aff'd mere., 296 N. Y. 502, 68 N. E. 2d 450
(1946) ; Fawcett v. Ryder, 23 N. D. 20, 135 N. W. 800 (1912) ; Stuart Circle Hospital-
Corp. v. Curry, 173 Va. 136, 3 S. E. 2d 153, 124 A. L. R. 176 (1939). Other types of
burns frequently give rise to litigation; see, e.g., Piedmont Hospital v. Anderson, 65 Ga.
App. 491, 16 S. E. 2d 90 (1941) (electric heating pad) ; Cornell v. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co., 8 S. 2d 364 (La. App. 1942) (incubator); Post v. Crown Heights
Hospital, Inc., 173 Misc. 250, 17 N. Y. S. 2d 409 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (hot medicine);
Flower Hospital v. Hart, 178 Okla. 447, 62 P. 2d 1248 (1936) (light bulb 'on bed);
Danville Community Hospital v. Thompson, 186 Va. 746, 43 S. E. 2d 882 (1947)
(incubator).
41. Necolayff v. Genessee Hospital, 270 App. Div. 648, 61 N. Y. S. 2d 832 (4th
Dep't 1946), aff'd mem., 296 N. Y. 936, 73 N. E. 2d 117 (1947).
42. Parrish v. Clark, 107 Fla. 598, 145 So. 848 (1933).
43. Stanley v. Schumpert, 117 La. 255, 41 So. 565, 6 L. R. A. (NT.s.) 306 (1906);
Collins v. Hertsfordshire County Counicil,'[1947] 1 K. B. 598. Contra: Steinert v. The
Brunswick Home, Inc., 172 Misc. 787, 16 N. Y. S. 2d 83 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd inem.,
259 App. Div. 1018, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 459 (2d Dep't 1940).
44. Emory University v. Shadburn, 47 Ga. App. 643, 171 S. E. 192 (1933), aff'd
inen., 180 Ga. 595, 180 S. E. 137 (1935); Hayhurst v. Boyd Hospital,- 43 Idaho 661,
254 Pac. 528 (1927); Croupp v. Garfield Park Sanitarium, 147 Ill. App. 7 (1909);
Maki v. Murray Hospital, 91 Mont. 251, 7 P. 2d 228 (1932): Wetzel v. Omaha Maternity
& General Hospital Ass'n, 96 Neb. 636, 148 N. W. 582 (1914); Robertson v. Towns
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The general duty to use care applied in all negligence cases would cover
adequately the problems arising out of the hospital-patient relationship. But
here, as in some other situations involving special relationships-such as that
of employer-employee at common law48-the courts have been accustomed to
refer to more specific duties which rest upon the institution. These duities
are still expressed in terms of a standard of reasonableness and are not
reduced to definite rules of conduct. They are used in instructions to the
jury and have the effect of calling the jury's attention to particular activities
or undertakings in which the hospital is held to the usual standard of reason-
able action. Some of the more important of these duties will now be examined.
One very large group of cases involves the duty of the hospital to use
care in furnishing to the patient premises and equipment which are safe and
adapted to his condition. For failure to furnish such premises in a careful
and reasonable manner there will be liability. For example, the hospital will
be held liable when the roof is allowed to leak upon a helpless patient who
contracts high fever as a result,49 or when water collects in the patient's
room during a rainstorm because of defective windows and the patient is made
ill from the dampness.50 The patient may recover from the hospital when he is
shocked because of defective wiring on electrical fixtures,51 or when frightened
and made ill by the explosion of a defective electric fan.52 As a rule the patient
may rely upon the institution to supply safe furnishings, such as beds ;53 his
position is that of an invitee or business guest 54 and he must avoid only
equipment containing obvious or known defects. Not only must the hospital
Hospital, 178 App. Div. 285, 165 N. Y. Supp. 17 (2d Dep't 1918); Goldfoot v. Lofgren,
135 Ore. 533, 296 Pac. 843 (1931). Even if a patient has not contracted for a special
nurse, his condition may be such that the hospital is under an obligation to keep him
under constant supervision. Durfee v. Dorr, 123 Ark. 542, 186 S. W. 62 (1916);
Stansfield v. Gardner, 57 Ga. App. 634, 193 S. E. 375 (1937); Hignite's Adm x v.
Louisville Neuropathic Sanitorium, 223 Ky. 497, 4 S. W. 2d 407 (1928).
45. Guilliams v. Hollywood Hospital, 18 Cal. 2d 97, 114 P. 2d 1 (1941); Gilstrap
v. Osteopathic Sanatorium Co., 224 Mo. App. 798, 24 S. W. 2d 249 (1929); cf. Giusti v.
Weston Co., 165 Ore. 565, 108 P. 2d 1010 '(1941) (failure to discover true nature of
injury inflicted outside of hospital).
46. Hansch v. Hackett, 190 Wash. 97, 66 P. 2d 1129 (1937).
47. Valentin v. La Societe Francaise, 76 Cal. App. 2d 1, 172 P. 2d 359 (1946).
48. PRossER, TORTs 505 et seq. (1941).
49. Tulsa Hospital Ass'n v. Juby, 73 Okla. 243, 175 Pac. 519 (1918).
50. Bailey v. Long, 175 N. C. 687, 94 S. E. 675 (1917).
51. Baker v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 133 Cal. App. 243, 23 P. 2d 1071 (1933).
52. Gardner v. Newnan Hospital, 58 Ga. App. 104, 198 S. E. 122 (1938).
53. Welsh v. Mercy Hospital, 65 Cal. App. 2d 473, 151 P. 2d 17 (1944) ; cf.
Meshel v. Crotona Park Sanitarium, 154 Misc. 221, 276 N. Y. Supp. 989 (N. Y.
City Ct. 1935).
54. Welsh v. Mercy Hospital, supra note 53.
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premises be safe; they must also be kept reasonably clean and sanitary.55 The
institution may be liable also when the premises are not adapted to the condi-
tion of the patient; for example, hospitals have been held liable fof not
having windows sufficiently secured to prevent the escape of delirious pa-
tients,56 and for failing to provide sideboards for the beds of those known to
be restless or likely to fall off.
57
Similar to the duty to furnish safe premises is the duty to use care in
supplying to doctors and nurses adequate facilities for the ireatment of pa-
tients. The equipment supplied to X-ray technicians, 58 to nurses,5 9 and to
doctors in operating rooms 60 must be in good order; the degree of care re-
quired in this regard is very high,61 and for failure to furnish such equipment
in good condition the hospital will be responsible to the injured patient. In
this respect its duty is said to be that of the owner of chattels who supplies
them to third persons with knowledge of the manner in which they are to be
used.62 Nevertheless, this duty on the part of the hospital is limited by the
skill and experience of the doctors and nurses; if the equipment is such that
a trained nurse should recognize its unfitness and not use it, the negligence
of the nurse will cut off the liability of the hospital, provided she is not its
servant 63 and provided that the emergency of the situation does not demand
that the equipment be used regardless of its condition. At least one court has
felt that even if a hospital negligently maintains its operating room, the
patient should be allowed to recover only from the independent physician
55. Woodlawn Infirmary v. Byers, 216 Ala. 210, 112 So. 831 (1927) (dirty premises
evidence of negligence of hospital where patient died of tetanus) ; see Croupp v. Garfield
Park Sanitorium, 147 Ill. App. 7 (1909) (duty to have premises clean stressed but
evidence insufficient to show injury resulted from breach of the duty); Moses v. St.
Barnabas Hospital, 130 Minn. 1, 153 N. W. 128 (1915) (same).
56. Wood v. Samaritan Institution, Inc., 26 Cal. 2d 847, 161 P. 2d 556 (1945) ; Paulen
v. Shinnick, 291 Mich. 288, 289 N. W. 162 (1939); Spivey v. St. Thomas Hospital,
211 S. W. 2d 450 (Tenn. App. M. S. 1947).
57. Ranelli v. Society of New York Hospital, 295 N. Y. 850, 67 N. E. 2d 257
(1946); Bickford v. Peck Memorial Hospital, 266 App. Div. 875, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 20
(2d Dep't 1943) ; cf. Silva v. Providence Hospital, 87 P. 2d 374 (Cal. App. 1939); aff'd,
14 Cal. 2d 762, 97 P. 2d 798 (1939) (charitable hospital held upon basis of implied
contract with paying patient for not furnishing sideboards).
58. Runyan v. Goodrum, 147 Ark. 481, 228 S. W. 397, 13 A. L. R. 1403 (1921).
59. Butler v. Northwestern Hospital, 202 Minn. 282, 278 N. W. 37 (1938) (defective
clamp on rubber tubing); Woodhouse v. Knickerbocker Hospital, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 671
(Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd iner., 266 App. Div. 839, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 518 (1st Dep't 1943)
(defective incubator for infants) ; see Payne v. Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital, 2 Cal.
App. 2d 270, 37 P. 2d 1061, 1062 (1934).
60. Delling v. Lake View Hospital Ass'n, 310 Ill. App. 155, 33 N. E. 2d 915 (1941).
61. See Runyan v. Goodrum, 147 Ark. 481, 228 S. W. 397, 403, 13 A. L. R. 1403
(1921).
62. Butler v. Northwestern Hospital, 202 Minn. 282, 278 N. W. 37, 38 (1938);
Woodhouse v. Knickerbocker Hospital, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 671, 674 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd
mem., 266 App. Div. 839, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 518 (1st Dep't 1943); RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 318 (1934).
63. Payne v. Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital, 2 Cal. App. 2d 270, 37 P. 2d 1061
(1934). However, the nurse has no duty to investigate the mechanical parts of appar-
ently good equipment in order to discover defects. Ratliffe v. Weslev Hospital, 135 Kan.




who chooses to use the facilities, and not from the hospital itself."4 This posi-
tion, however, is not in keeping with that taken in the Restatement of TortsG6
and has not been generally followed.
Since in treating patients a hospital is dealing with persons not in normal
physical health and often not mentally balanced, another very important
specific duty resting upon it is the duty to use care in protecting patients from
dangers which often would not threaten normal persons.6 6 This duty includes
safeguarding the patient from self-inflicted injuries ;67 it is well illustrated
in the many cases where the hospital has been found negligent in allowing
patients to leap from hospital windows and fire escapes.68 In instructing the
jury the courts always stress that a hospital is not an insurer of the safety
of its inmates.69 But if the agents of the hospital know from all of the acts
and statements of the patient that he is likely to harm himself, or if they
should anticipate this from his condition, then the liability of the hospital in
fact approaches the point of being absolute when the patient does leap from a
window 0 or when he commits suicide.71 But if the patient has apparently
been tractable and if he has shown no tendency toward violence, the jury
may find that his action was completely unforeseeable and beyond the scope
64. Robinson v. Crotwell, 175 Ala. 194, 57 So. 23 (1911).
65. §318 (1934).
66. One measure of the hospital's duty to use care in treating and protecting the
patient is the ability of the latter to protect and care for himself. See note 30 supra.
Quite often it is only the incapacity and helplessness of the patient which render the rules
of contributory negligence inapplicable to the particular case. Fetzer v. Aberdeen Clinic,
48 S. D. 308, 204 N. W. 364, 367, 39 A. L. R. 1423 (1925). If the patient could reasonably
have avoided harm to himself he will be held contributorily negligent. Dittert v. Fischer,
148 Ore. 366, 36 P. 2d 592 (1934) (patient who had learned to operate heating pad
unable to recover for burns received when he left it on and went to 'sleep). But if the
patient is negligent only after an injury has been received through the negligence of tle
hospital, he may still recover for injury itself; his negligence only goes in mitigation of
damages. Jenkins v. Charleston General Hospital, 90 W. Va. 230, 110 S. E. 560, 22 A. L.
R. 32. (1922).
1 Emory University v. Shadburn, 47 Ga. App. 643, 171 S. E. 192 (1933), aff'd menr.,
180 Ga. 595, 180 S. E. 137 (1935) ; Hignite's Adm'x v. Louisville Neuropathic Sanitorium,
223 Ky. 497, 4 S. W. 2d 407 (1928); Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein,
144 Minn. 392, 175 N. W. 699 (1920); Pangle v. Appalachian Hall, 190 N. C. 833, 131
S. E. 42 (1925) ; James v. Turner, 184 Tenn. 563, 201 S. W. 2d 691 (1941) ; Vanderbilt
University v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S. W. 2d 284 (M. S. 1938).
68. Durfee v. Dorr, 123 Ark. 542, 186 S. W. 2d 62 (1916); Fowler v. Norways
Sanitorium, 112 Ind. App. 347, 42 N. E. 2d 415 (1942) ; Davis v. Springfield Hospital,
204 Mo. App. 626, 218 S. W. 696 (1920) ; Robertson v. Towns Hospital, 178 Anp. Div.
285, 165 N. Y. Supp. 17 (1918); Wetzel v. Omaha Maternity & General Hospital Ass'n,
96 Neb. 636, 148 N. W. 582 (1914) ; Spivey v. St. Thomas Hospital. 211 S. W. 2d 450
(Tenn. App. M. S. 1947); Torrey v. Riverside Sanitarium, 163 Wis. 71, 157 N. W.
552 J1916). See note 36 supra.
69. Stansfield v. Gardner, 56 Ga. App. 634, 193 S. E. 375, 381 (1937) ; Paulen v.
Shinnick, 291 Mich. 288, 289 N. W. 162 (1939); Maki v. Murray Hospital, 91 Mont.
251, 7 P. 2d 228 (1932); Harris v. Woman's Hospital, 14 N. Y. Supp. 881 (N. Y. City
Ct. 1891); Hogan v. Clarksburg Hospital Co., 63 W. Va. 84, 59 S. E. 943 (1907).
70. E.g., Spivey v. St. Thomas Hospital, 211 S. W. 2d 450 (Tenn. App. M. S.
1947). See note 18 supra.
71. E.g., Hignite's Adm'x v. Louisville Neuropathic Sanitorium, 223 Ky. 497, 4
.S. W. 2d 407 (1928).
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of the hospital's responsibilty.72 As mentioned previously,78 there may be a
duty upon the sanitarium specializing in nervous and mental cases to inquire
into the past history of the patient and to learn upon admitting him more
facts than an ordinary general hospital will be required to know.
4
Another specific duty of the hospital is that of safeguarding the patient
from injury inflicted by third persons, including other patients75 and the
hospital's own employees. 76 In this respect its duty is very much like that
owed by a carrier to its passengers.7 7 Thus a hospital- may be held liable
when medical students improperly examine a female patient,
7 8 or when an
attendant abuses a patient and compels him to fight with a third person.
79
By reason of his relationship with the institution, the patient is "entitled to
reasonably kind treatment so far as the nature of his malady [will] . . .
allow." so At least one case has suggested by way of dictum that the duty of
protection would extend to a situation where a stranger entered the premises
and harmed the patient ;81 while no cases on the point have been found, there
seems to be no valid objection to such responsibility.
. Another specific duty resting upon the hospital is the duty to use care
in the selection of physicians, nurses and specialists when it undertakes to
furnish their services.8 2 For failure to furnish competent staff physicians or
to select competent doctors if it contracts to furnish medical service, the
hospital will be liable to the patient. 83 It is part of its undertaking that its
72. Harris v. Woman's Hospital, 14 N. Y. Supp. 881 (N. Y. City Ct. 1891); James
v. Turner, 184 Tenn. 563, 201 S. W. 2d 691 (1941).
73. See notes 31, 32 supra.
74. See Mesedahl v. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n, 194 Minn. 198, 259 N. W. 819,
823 (1935).
75. University of Louisville v. Hammock, 127 Ky. 564, 106 S. W. 219, 14 L. R. A.
(N.s.) 784 (1907) (patient with delirium tremens insufficiently guarded, and injured
plaintiff, a fellow patient); cf. Papini v. Alexander Sanitarium, Inc., 12 Cal. App. 2d
249, 55 P. 2d 270 (1936) (evidence insufficient to prove decedent killed by fellow patient
but duty to protect recognized). The duty of the hospital in a situation like the Hammock
case is that of one haying a dangerous person in charge. -RESTATEMENT, ToRTS § 319
(1934).
76. E.g., Lord v. Claxton, 62 Ga. App. 526, 8 S. E. 2d 657 (1940) (physician who
owned hospital drugged plaintiff and kept her in hospital while others defrauded her);
Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hospital, 23 N. W. 2d 247 (N. D. 1946) (hospital held for
libel of patient by employee) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 320 (1934).
77. PROSSER, TORTS 198 (1941); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 315 (1934); Harper and
Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L. J. 886, 903 (1934).
78. Inderbitzen v. Lane Hospital Co., 124 Cal. App. 462, 12 P. 2d 744 (1932),
rehearing denied, 124 Cal. App. 469, 13 P. 2d 905 (1932).
79. Galesburg Sanitarium v. Jacobson, 103 Ill. App. 26 (1902).
80. Id. at 28; cf. Stone v. Eisen Co. 219 N. Y. 205, 114 N. E. 44 (1916).
81. See Vannah v. Hart Private Hospital, 228 Mass. 132, 117 N. E. 328, 329 (1917).
82. E.g., Black v. Fischer, 30 Ga. App. 109, 117 S. E. 103 (1923) ; Stacy v. Williams,
253 Ky. 353, 69 S. W. 2d 697 (1934) ; Howe v. Medical Arts Center Hospital, 261 App.
Div. 1088, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 957 (2d Dep't 1941) ; Pangle v. Appalachian Hall, 190 N. C.
833, 131 S. E. 42 (1925). This rule applies to charitable hospitals as well as to private
institutions. E.g., England v. Hospital of the Good Samaritan, 16 Cal. App. 2d 640, 61
P. 2d 48 (1936) ; Mikota v. Sisters of Mercy, 183 Iowa 1378, 168 N. W. 219 (1918);
Note, 48 YALE L. J. 81, 86 (1938).
83. Howe v. Medical Arts Center Hospital, 261 App. Div. 1088, 26 N. Y. S. 2d
957 (2d Dep't 1941) (incompetent nurse) ; Goldfoot v. Lofgren, 135 Ore. 533, 296 Pac.
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physicians or those whom it procures will meet the standard of skill, educa-
tion and ability usually applied to their profession.8 4 There have, however,
been few indications that the hospital must set any standards for the inde-
pendent physicians and nurses who use its facilities or that it will be liable
for permitting such use by incompetent physicians. 8 5 That a private hospital
may set the standards for those who use its facilities as practitioners is
clear.88 And if its officers knowingly permit a layman to attempt to treat a
patient, the hospital may be liable to the latter ;87 the same is true if they
knowingly permit any other unlawful medical acts to be done on the premises. 88
But apparently no court has yet required the hospital to exclude duly licensed
but incompetent professional persons.
Respondeat Superior
The group of hospital cases presenting the greatest conflict of authority
are those in which the hospital is sued for the negligent conduct of a doctor
or nurse. Most of these cases are concerned with the doctrine of respondeal
superior rather than with the actual standard of care owed by the institution
to the patient; yet it is pertinent at this point to examine some of them in
connection with the latter subject.
All courts are agreed that a hospital is not liable for the negligent con-
duct of doctors and nurses who are in the employment of the patient, and
who merely use its facilities for the purposes of treatment.89 Over these
servants of the patient the hospital has no control, and it should not be
responsible for their conduct.
Much more difficult is the situation where the hospital's own staff phy-
sicians negligently treat the patient or where the hospital contracts to fur-
843 (1931) (same); cf. Rowencamp v. Post Graduate Medical School and Hospital,
254 App. Div. 265, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 751 (2d Dep't 1938), rcv'd, 256 App. Div. 957, 10 N. Y.
S. 2d 669 (2d Dep't 1939) (evidence insufficient to prove negligence in selection of
doctor but liability recognized where proof is adequate); Smith v. Duke University,
219 N. C. 628, 14 S. E. 2d 643 (1941) (same). See note 80 supra.
84. Pangle v. Appalachian Hall, 190 N. C. 833, 131 S. E. 42, 43 (1935).
85. Note, 48 YALE L. J. 81, 85 (1938).
86. Hughes v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 289 Ky. 123, 158 S. W. 2d 159 (1942);
Harris v. Thomas, 217 S. W. 1068 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); State ex rel. Wolf v. La
Crosse Lutheran Hospital Ass'n,.181 Wis. 33, 193 N. W. 994 (1923).
87. Hendrickson v. Hodkin, 276 N. Y. 252, 11 N. E. 2d 899 (1937), 22 MI NI.
L. REV. 283 (1938).
88. E.g., Grawunder v. Beth Israel Hospital Ass'n. 242 App. Div. 56, 272 N. Y.
Supp. 171 (2d Dep't 1934), aff'd inm., 266 N. Y. 605, 195 N. E. 221 (1934) (unlawful
autopsy on body); see Schloendorff v. New York Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E.
92, 95 (1914).
89. Barfield v. South Highland Infirmary, 191 Ala. 553, 68 So. 30 (1915): Kamps
v. Crown Heights Hospital, Inc., 251 App. Div. 849, 296 N. Y. Supp. 776 (2d Dep't
1937), aff'd inem., 277 N. Y. 602, 14 N. E. 2d 184 (1938) ; Hendrickson v. Hodkin, 250
App. Div. 619, 294 N. Y. Supp. 982 (2d Dep't 1937), rev'd on other grounds, 276
N. Y. 252, 11 N. E. 2d 899 (1937); Penland v. French Broad Hospital, Inc., 199
N. C. 314, 154 S. E. 406 (1930); Holland v. Eugene Hospital, 127 Ore. 256, 270 Pac.
784 (1928).
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nish the services of a physician and that physician is negligent. In these cases
the courts have split sharply. As mentioned previously, the courts are
agreed that the hospital must use care in selecting staff physicians or doctors
whose services it has contracted to supply. But if a doctor who has been,
carefully selected nevertheless fails to use due care in the particular case, some
courts have felt that the hospital ought not to be responsible. 90 A few courts
have exempted the institution upon the ground that it may not practice
medicine and therefore may not be held for negligence in medical treatment,
even if it contracts to furnish such treatment. 91 Others have exempted the
hospital simply because it cannot control the professional acts of its physicians
and have treated the doctor as an independent contractor as to these acts.92
These courts have attempted to draw a distinction between "professional"
and "administrative" acts, and if the physician is performing only the latter
the hospital can be held liable.93 With the exception of "administrative" acts,
this group of courts would limit the obligation of the hospital towards the
patient to the selection of a competent physician.
94
Other courts, however, have applied the rule of respondeat superior more
broadly and have held the hospital liable for the negligent professional acts of
physicians whom it had power to employ and discharge.95 These courts hold
that if a hospital undertakes, through those whom it employs, to furnish
medical services in addition to the routine services of furnishing facilities,
nurses, and equipment, it is liable for the negligence of those rendering the
90. E.g., Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P. 2d 372 (1944), 17 ROCKY MT. L.
REv. 124; Black v. Fischer, 30 Ga. App. 109, 117 S. E. 103 (1923) ; Iterman v. Baker,
214 Ind. 308, 15 N. E. 2d 365 (1938); Stacy v. Williams, 253 Ky. 353, 69 S. W. 2d 697
(1934); see Kamps v. Crown Heights Hospital, Inc., 251 App. Div. 849, 296 N. Y.
Supp. 776, 777 (2d Dep't 1937), affd mere., 277 N. Y. 602, 14 N. E. 2d 184 (1938);
Steinert v. The Brinswick Home, Inc., 172 Misc. 787, 16 N. Y. S. 2d 83, 85 (Sup.
Ct. 1939), aff'd mere., 259 App. Div. 1018, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 459 (2d Dep't 1940).
91. Black v. Fischer, 30 Ga. App. 109, 117 S. E. 103 (1923); Iterman v. Baker,
214 Ind. 308, 15 N. E. 2d 365 (1938). But cf. Stuart Circle Hospital Corp. v. Curry,
173 Va. 136, 3 S. E. 2d 153, 124 A. L. R. 176 (1939).
92. Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P. 2d 372 (1944), 17 RoCKY MT. L. REv.
124; Hoke v. Harrisburg Hospital, Inc., 281 Ill. App. 247 (1935) ; see In re Renouf, 254
N. Y. 349, 173 N. E. 218, 219 (1930); Mieryjeski v. Bay Ridge Sanitarium, 237 App.
Div. 851, 261 N. Y. Supp. 927 (2d Dep't 1932); Steinert v. The Brunswick Home, Inc.,
172 Misc. 787, 16 N. Y. S. 2d 83 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd inem., 259 App. Div. 1018, 20
N. Y. S. 2d 459 (2d Dep't 1940).
93. Fowler v. Norways Sanitorium, 112 Ind. App. 347, 42 N. E. 2d 415 (1942);
Dillon v. Rockaway Beach Hospital, 284 N. Y. 176, 30 N. E. 2d 373 (1940); Post v.
Crown Heights Hospital, Inc., 173 Misc. 250, 17 N. Y. S. 2d 409 (Sup. Ct. 1940);
CLERIC AND LINDSELL, ToRTs 272-74 (9th ed., Potter, 1937) ; 14 BROOKLYN L. 'REV. 293
(1948).
94. Black v. Fischer, 30 Ga. App. 109, 117 S. E. 103 (1923); Stacy v. Williams,
253 Ky. 353, 69 S.. W. 2d 697 (1934); Iterman v. Baker, 214 Ind. 308, 15 N. E.
2d 365 (1938).
95. Brown v. La Societe Francaise, 138 Cal. 475, 71 Pac. 516 (1903) ; Valentin v.
La Societe Francaise, 76 Cal. App. 2d 1, 172 P. 2d 359 (1946). Gilstrap v. Osteopathic
Sanatorium, 224 Mo. App. 798, 24 S. W. 2d 249 (1929); Stuart Circle Hospital Corp.
v. Curry, 173 Va. 136, 3 S. E. 2d 153, 124 A. L. R. 176 (1939) ; Vaughan v. Memorial
Hospital, 100 W. Va. 290, 130 S. E. 481 (1925); Treptau v. Behrens Spa, Inc., 247
Wis. 438, 20 N. W. 2d 108 (1945).
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treatment and may not claim that they are independent contractors.00 Even if
statutes prohibit the practice of medicine by a hospital, an institution holding
out as its agent one who negligently renders professional services may be held
upon estoppel ;97 and if it agrees to furnish such services it may be held upon
its contract 8
Other and similar problems and splits of authority are found in connec-
tion with the negligence of nurses and internes.99 Particularly has the "bor-
rowed servant" doctrine been important in limiting the liability of a hospital
for the negligence of nurses and internes acting under the orders of physi-
cians.100 However, it has been pointed out that even if a nurse follows the
orders of the patient's own doctor, she may still be under the control of the
hospital, and it may be responsible if she fails to give any treatment reasonably
required in addition to or in spite of the orders of the doctor.1 1 Some courts,
as in the case of physicians, have attempted to distinguish the "administra-
tive" acts of nurses and internes from their "professional" acts, and the re-
sults have at times been very artificial and difficult to justify.
102
The better rule in all of these cases would seem to require an examina-
96. E.g., Jenkins v. Charleston General Hospital, 90 W. Va. 230, 110 S. E. 560,
22 A. L. R. 323 (1922).
97. Hedlund v. Sutter Medical Service Co., 51 Cal. App. 2d 327, 124 P. 2d 878
(1942). But cf. Hull v. Enid General Hospital Foundation, 194 Okla. 446, 152 P. 2d
693 (1944).
98. See note 12 supra.
99. 1 VAND. L. REv. 153 (1947).
100. If the hospital's employee can be found to be acting under the control of a
-physician, the hospital will not be liable for the employee's negligence. E.g., Hull v.
Enid General Hospital Foundation, 194 Okla. 446, 152 P. 2d 693 (1944). The problem
of determining whether a nurse or interne is under the control of the physician and
when under the control of the hospital is very difficult. A famous English case stated
that the moment a nurse stepped into the operating arena she left the hospital's control.
Hillyer v. Bartholomew's Hospital, [1909] 2 K. B. 820 (C. A.) 'Subsequent English
and Dominion cases have repudiated this rule, however, so that at present hospitals are
usually held liable for the negligence of nurses whether acting under a physician's
orders, and therefore "professionally," or not. Dunphy, Liability of a Hosl'ital for the
Negligence of its Staff, 17 AusT. L. J. 82 (1943), 21 Ausr. L. J. 302 (1947) ; Goodhart,
Hospitals and Trained Nurses, 54 L. Q. Rav. 553 (1938); Note, 16 CAN. B. REv. 654
(1938); 10 AusT. L. J. 317 (1936).
101. Valentin v. La Societe Francaise, 76 Cal. App. 2d 1, 172 P. 2d 359 (1946);
Wetzel v. Omaha Maternity & General Hospital Ass'n, 96 Neb. 636, 148 N. W. 582
(1914); Broz v. Omaha Maternity & General Hospital Ass'n, 96 Neb. 648, 148 N. W.
575 (1914) ; Flower Hospital v. Hart, 178 Okla. 447, 62 P. 2d 1248 (1936).
102. Compare Sutherland v. Polyclinic Medical School and Hospital, 273 App, Div.
29, 75"N. Y. S. 2d 135 (1st Dep't 1947), 14 BROoKLYN L. Ray. 293 (1948), aff'd incm.,
298 N. Y. 682, 82 N. E. 2d 583 (1948) (applying hot water bottle a "professional" act;
hospital not liable), with Iacono v. Polyclinic Medical School and Hospital, 269 App. Div.
955, 58 N. Y. S. 2d 244 (2d Dep't 1945) (applying hot water bottle an "administrative"
act; hospital liable.) Compare Ranelli v. Society of New York Hospital, 295 N. Y. 850,
67 N. E. 2d 257 (1946) (leaving patient unguarded on bed an "administrative" act), with
Andrews v. Roosevelt Hospital, 259 App. Div. 733, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 447 (2d Dep't 1940)
(leaving patient unguarded on table a "professional" act). Compare Steinert v. The
Brunswick Home; Inc., 172 Misc. 787, 16 N. Y. S. 2d 83 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd mem.,
259 App. Div. 1018, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 459 (2d Dep't 1940) (negligent injection of medicine
before operation a "professional" act), with Post v. Crown Heights Hospital, Inc., 173
Misc. 250, 17 N. Y. S. 2d 409 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (negligent injection of medicine after
operation an "administrative' act).
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tion into what the hospital has .undertaken to do for the patient. If it has.
undertaken to furnish the professional services of doctors and nurses on its.
staff, 0 3 then the mere fact that it cannot control all the details of their acts
would seem to be no reason to excuse it from liability. In this respect the
hospital would seem to be in a position no different from that of any other
employer of skilled persons.10 4 If, on the other hand, the hospital undertakes
to furnish its facilities only, it should not be liable for the negligence of
doctors and nurses. And although the "borrowed servant" rule may at times
have some validity in this field, there seems to be very little realism in the
attempted distinction between "professional" and "administrative" acts.
IV. CONCLUSION
As can be seen from the foregoing, the courts have imposed rather high
requirements in several aspects of the relationship between hospital and
patient. Nevertheless the liability of the hospital is in no sense absolute. For
instance, its duty to protect the patient from harm by its employees does not
render it liable when an employee strikes a patient in self-defense 105 nor when
force becomes necessary to restrain an unruly inmate. 06 One recent Tennes-
see case excused a general hospital from liability when police entered the
premises and killed a violent and delirious patient while attempting to subdue
him ;107 the court indicated that even if the institution had been a mental
hospital the result would have been the same.
The hospital serves a vital function in the life of the community. It is
essential that it be held to a high degree of care; but on the other hand, its
103. There are many statements, particularly in the New York cases, that a hospital!
undertakes to provide only food, facilities, routine attendance and skilled independent
contractors, and that medical care is no part of its undertaking toward the patient.
See, e.g., In re Renouf, 254 N. Y. 349, 173 N. E. 218, 219 (1930); Steinert v. The
Brunswick Home, Inc., 172 Misc. 787, 16 N. Y. S. 2d 83, 85 (Sup. Ct. 1939). This view
seems to be rather unrealistic in the light of the skill and knowledge required for mem-
bership upon the staffs of many institutions. Certainly most hospitals hold themselves
out as offering medical treatment. "The object, aim and purpose of a hospital, the reason
for its establishment and operation, is to render and perform medical treatment and
nursing of a skilled character .... The patient comes to the hospital for advice, aid, and
treatment .. ." Stuart Circle Hospital Corp. v. Curry, 173 Va. 136, 3 S. E. 2d 153, 157,
124 A. L. R. 176 (1939).
104. E.g., Tetting v. Hotel Pfister, 221 Wis. 141, 206 N. W. 249 (1936) (professional
man may be servant even though his employer cannot control his actions other than to
hire or discharge); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 233 (1933); 10 AUST. L. J. 317, 318
(1936). Even if the doctor is considered an independent contractor, as no doubt he
should be in many ibstances, nevertheless the institution might well be held liable where
it has agreed to furnish his services; the hospital might be held as the employer of an
independent contractor engaged to perform an extremely hazardous or a non-delegable
duty. See Jenkins v. Charleston General Hospital, 90 W. Va. 230, 110 S. E. 560, 562, 22
A. L. R. 323 (1922); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 214, comment b (1933).
105. Nelson v. Rural Education Ass'n, 23 Tenn. App. 409, 134 S. W. 2d 181 (M. S.
1939).
106. See Galesburg Sanitarium v. Jacobson, 103 Ill. App. 26, 28 (1902); Smith,
Legal Responsibility for Surgical Practice in THOREK, SURGICAL ERRORS AND SAFEGUARDS
990 (4th ed. 1943).
107. O'Quin v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, 184 Tenn. 570, 201 S. W. 2d 694 (1947).
674 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [VOL. 2
liability must not be so broad that operation of it becomes a financial hazard.
While the modern tendency to make even charitable as well as private insti-
tutions liable for the negligence of their servants seems justifiable and whole-
some, 0 8 nevertheless the courts must also have regard for the social necessity
of the institutions. Although the availability of liability insurance may do much
to relieve the burden of responsibility resting upon hospitals, 1 9 policy
congiderations must always be important in hospital cases. A general policy
favoring such useful institutions may be the real basis for many of the deci-
sions which have cut off liability of even private hospitals in cases where
there is apparently little other reason to excuse them." 0
WILLIAM J. HARBISON
108. Note, 19 Miss. L. J. 220 (1948) ; 1 VAND. L. REv. 153 (1947) ; 1 VAND. L. REV.
470 (1948).
109. 7 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4502 (1942); 1 VAND. L. REV.
470 (1948).
110. Particularly does this seem to be true in the cases where liability has been
cut off on the basis of "professional" conduct. See note 102 supra.
